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DOMESTIC RELATIONS-THE MODERN TREND TOWARD
REJECTION OF RECRIMINATION
The Supreme Court of New Mexico in Pavletich v. Pavietich
recently overruled a previous decision2 and held that where the hus-
band and wife are irreconcilable, divorce will no longer be denied on
the ground of recrimination. This is a commendable reform by a con-
temporary court with respect to an age-encumbered inheritance.
A critical examination of modern mores, statutes, decisions, and
practical application of the doctrine proves recrimination is effete
and should be stricken from the law. A pertinent observation was
made by the court in question in these words:
"The views of the people in the courts of the world
on recrimination as a bar to divorce are slowly chang-
ing." 3
Recrimination is a counter-charge in a divorce suit that the com-
plainant also has been guilty of an offense which is a ground for
divorce.' In the majority of states the doctrine is well settled, and the
paradoxical result follows that if both parties are guilty of matrunon-
ial offenses which are grounds for divorce neither can obtain one.'
The four basic theories ordinarily offered in support of the doc-
trine of recrimination are: (1) the clean hands maxim; (2) a con-
tract theory of marriage; (3) the theory that divorce is a remedy
for the innocent and the injured exclusively; and (4) the mainte-
nance of family unity. The doctrine is based primarily and most
frequently on the equitable maxim that he who comes into equity
must come with clean hands Basing the doctrine of recrimination
upon the premise of the necessary applicability of an equitable
maxim is clearly a fallacy, because history shows that divorce did
not originate in equity but had its ancestry in the ecclesiastical
courts.! Therefore the doctrine of recrimination need not necessarily
inherit the traits of equity, since it is not the offspring of equity
exclusively Some jurisdictions even speak of divorce as an action
' 50 N.M. 224, 174 P 2d 826 (1946)
'Chavez v Chavez, 39 N.M. 480, 50 P 2d 264 (1935).
'Pavletich v Pavletich, 50 N.M. 224, 174 P 2d 826, 830 (1946).
'MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1931) sec. 92.
GDay v Day 71 Kan. 385, 80 Pac. 974 (1905) Buckley v.
Buckley, 214 Ky 566, 283 S.W 1031 (1926) Manmn v. Manning,
188 Ky 140, 221 S.W 522 (1920) Green v. Green, 125 Md. 141, 93
Atl. 400 (1915), Daly v Daly 137 Pa. Super. 403, 9 A. 2d 192 (1939)
MADDEN, Op. cit. supra note. 4. 1
'Brazell v. Brazell, 54 Cal. App. 2d .458, 129 P 2d 117 (1942)
Day v. Day, 71 Kan. 385, 80 Pac. 974 (1905) Phillips v. Phillips, 48
Ohio App. 322, 193 N.E. 657 (1933)
'Zacharias, Recimmnation 'in the Divorce Law of Illinois (1936)
14 CmI-KENT REV. 217, 220.
STUDENT NOTES AND COI ENTS
at law rather than a suit in equity.8 Other jurisdictions do classify
it broadly as an equity action, i.e., as sum generts and yet the clean
hands doctrine is strictly applied in many jurisdictions where
divorce proceedings are'treated as equitable. ' Thus, analysis indi-
cates the reason that the equitable maxim is so firmly entrenched in
our law may well be attributed in no small degree to lackadaisical
courts and historical accident, rather than to logic and reason. And as
will be suggested in the following paragraphs, there is not even
justification for borrowing and applying the clean hands maxim in
the divorce cases which are made to turn upon recrimination. The
maxim is neither necessary nor suitable.
Another theory offered is that marriage is a contract, and on
principles of contract law the plaintiff cannot demand rescission if
he has failed to perform the condition of the contract on his part."
This line of approach becomes unconvincing when the argument
has to be met that the marriage relation differs fundamentally
from the ordinary contract," and that difference properly excludes
any necessary application of principles of rescission to the marriage
status. It is also contended that divorce is a remedy for the innocent
and injured exclusively.'3 This seems a product of facile rationaliza-
tion by courts rather than a basis upon which to found a theory.
The courts express the view that the family is the basic unit of
society and must be preserved." This is an attempt at a sociological
justification and evinces procrastination of modern day thought
when used in support of recrimination. Beamer has severely criti-
cized this theory in the following words:
"Forty-seven out of the forty-eight of our state
governments, and a respectable majority of foreign
governments all of whom, it is assumed, have a vital
interest in the maintenance of the family have decided
that the interests of both the family and of the state
can best be served by permitting divorce in certain
situations. And the .present tendency seems to be toward
a further liberalization of the divorce laws. This de-
cision and tendency may be said to be due to a slowly
awakening realization- that denial of divorce seldom
restores life to families sociologically dead when they
come into court, and that if anything is preserved it
is but the dead and empty shells of what has been and
is no longer-a realization that upon the refusal of
'Watts v. Watts, 312 Mass. 442, 45 N.E. 2d 273 (1942).
'Lingner v. Lmgner, 165 Tenn. 525, 56 S.W 2d 749 (1933),
Broch v. Broch, 164 Tenn. 2_'9, 47 S.W 2d 84 (1932)
"Hatfield v. Hatfield, 213 Mich. 368, 181 N.W 968 (1921),
Maurer v. Maurer, 150 Ore. 130, 42 P 2d 186 (1935)
20Spansenburg v. Carter, 151 La. 1038, 92 So. 673, 677 (1922)
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 31 L. Ed. 654, 8 Sup. Ct. 773
(1888).
"See Day v. Day, 71 Kan. 385, 80 Pac. 974 (1905)."See Decker v Decker, 193 Ill. 285, 61 N.E. 1108, 1109 (1901).
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divorce, those things which cannot be done legally are
often done illegally, those things which cannot be done
openly are done clandestinely; that other relationships
are formed, nameless children are born; and that even if
the parties force themselves to remain together, their
children probably will not thank them for it or even
be imbued with any high and lasting ideals about their
family, or the family as a sociological concept.
If this is the justification for permitting divorce
when only one party is at fault, how much more reason-
able is it to permit divorce when both parties hold
their marriage vows in contempt, and the likelihood
that attempts at reconciliation will fail are thereby
doubled. Possibly at one time-when a party convicted
of adultery was prohibited from marrying again-a
distinction could be made. But if so, it is no longer valid
today." '
A careful survey of statutes and cases is instructive. In the
United States there are thirty-two jurisdictions recognizing the doc-
trine of recrimination by statute. Of these statutes there are eight
general types, varying from those permitting any ground for divorce
as a defense in recrimination to those statutes which permit only
adultery as a bar." Vernier has stated, "It is quite apparent that
-most pf these statutes are not a product of constructive social
thought. The recrimination statutes are a good example of the
uselessness and mischievous nature of the varied family legislation
existing in some of our states." " It has been held under a statute that
adultery cannot be set up by way of recrimination unless the adul-
tery of the defendant is the ground for divorce." We have the result
that while ,adultery will bar a suit for divorce on the ground of
adultery, it will not bar a suit on the ground of a less grievous of-
fense sudh as cruelty, for example.
Equally as absurd as these statutes are some of the cases. In one
of them the wife because she had sulky spells was held not an mno-
cent party and was- not entitled to a divorce for her husband's
brutal treatment The husband, in another case, asked for divorce
on the grounds of his wife's inability to enter into the marital rela-
tions. When the wife set up her husband's cruelty as a defense, the
husband was subsequently refused a divorce."
In still another case the husband deserted his wife and she
heard nothing of him but rumors of his death for twenty-seven years.
"Beamer, The Doctrine of Recrimination in Divorce Proceed-
zngs (1941) 10 KAN. CiTY LAW RE. 213, 249.
" 2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS (1932) see. 78.
'17 Id. at sec. 78, pp. 83-85.
" Buerfening v. Buerfening, 23 Minn. 563 (1877), MADDEN, PER-
SONS AND DOMESTIc RELATIONS (1931) sec. 92.
"Lawson v Lawson, - Mo. App. - 44 S.W 2d 191 (1931).
' Carmichael v Carmichael, 106 Ore. 198, 211 Pac. 916 (1923)
Cf. Decker v. Decker, 193. Ill. 285, 61 N.E. 1108 (1901)
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He returned with a second wife and children, but by then the first
wife had remarried and she continued to live with her second hus-
band. She was deemed guilty of such gross misconduct that she was
refused a divorce.'
If these preceding instances are criticized as exceptions, the
typical one is certainly not free from absurdity. In the typical case a
wife sues for divorce on the charge of cruelty and the divorce is
refused when it is shown that the husband had cause for divorce
against her also on the ground-of cruelty,' or on some other ground.
Surely in such a case, there is no likelihood of preserving a happy
family. Social, if not legal, reasons demand a divorce! A denial of an
absolute divorce by modern courts today by reason of recrimination
deprives the parties of a more extensive right than did the ecclesi-
astical courts which prevented only the divorce a mensa et thoro.
Recent decisions show that the trend is to discard recrimination.
Some of these which reaffirm the public's interest in the preserva-
tion of marriage have become realistic and have recognized that
society does not wish to perpetuate a status out of which harm must
necpssarily result." This trend is evidenced by the following limita-
tions that have been placed upon the doctrine: (1) statutes making
recrimination no longer an absolute bar; (2) statutes allowing the
court to exercise discretion in applying the doctrine; (3) the doc-
trine of comparative rectitude; and (4) modern case authority point-
ing toward a repudiation of the doctrine. There is recent legislation
in the District of Columbia" liberalizing divorce laws so that re-
,crimmation is no longer an absolute bar to divorce. In the case of
Vanderhuff v. Vanderhuff the United States Court of Appeals in
the District of Columbia said:
"From a social point of view it is hard to defend a
rule that recrimination is an absolute bar to the grant-
ing of a divorce. It requires parties who are guilty of
conduct which makes their marriage impossible of suc-
cess to continue their marital relationship as a sort of
punishment of their sins We believe our present
statute has changed the policy which made recrimina-
tion an absolute bar to divorce." "
The courts of England since 1857 have not been bound to pro-
nounce a decree to a petitioner guilty of adultery.' In Nevada, it
is provided by statute that a court shall not deny a divorce on
Matthewson v Matthewson, 18 R.I. 456, 28 Atl. 801 (1894)
Alexander v Alexander, 140 Ind. 555, 38 N.E. 855 (1890).
"Lmgner v. Lingner, 165 Tenn. 525, 56 S.W 2d 749 (1933)
-'D. C. CODE (1940) tit. 16, sec. 403.
"Vanderhuff v Vanderhuff (App. D. C. 1944) 144 F 2d 509
(1944).
"20 & 21 VIcT., c. 85, sec. 31 '(1857), 15 - -& 16 GEo. V c. 49, sec.
178 (1925), I ED. VIII & I GEO. VI, C. 57, sec. 4 (1937).
.NEv. COMP. LAWS (Hillyer Supp. 1931-1941) sec. 9467.01.
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ground of recrimination, but may in its discretion grant a divorce
to the one least at fault. Kansas and Oklahoma also have statute's
allowing the court to use its discretion as to the refusal to grant
divorce.
A definite limitation is the doctrine of comparative rectitude
applied by the courts in several jurisdictions." The cases accepting
this principle permit granting of divorce to the party least at fault
when the interests of the parties and of society will be served.
As regards modern case authority a court of the State of Wash-
ington, apparently without benefit of statute, has allowed a decree
of divorce where each party proved cruelty. Even in a jurisdiction
which strictly applies the "clean hands" doctrine, there are increas-
ing objections in dicta which emphasize that the doctrine of re-
crimination is founded on public policy, and that public policy may
wish it relaxed.'2
The sociological movement in jurisprudence which is uppermost
today, puts the human factor in the central position and uses logic
as an instrument. To quote from the Pavletich case:
"Is it really believed that spouses who have en-
gaged in litigation, sometimes for years, are going to
take up their marital relationships because seven fed-
eral judges have decided, sometimes in a few minutes,
that they ought to try again, that it was not proved,
And yet, countries which refuse to impose a business
partnership on an unwilling party, do not hesitate to
impose on unwilling spouses this most intimate of
human relations." '
The theory of recrimination as outlined is seldom put into
actual practice and it is the law's continued application of the doc-
trine which drives many irreconcilable married persons to bargain-
ing as a result of which one party agrees to default and "justice" "s
done in a lawyer's office, instead of by an impartial court. Today
collusion thrives upon recrimination and the only case where there
is likelihood of resort to the defense of recrimination is the one
where the litigant fails to "bargain" successfully out of court. The
courts, in perpetuating a static theory through blind adherence to
stare decists have hindered justice rather than furthered it. It is
indeed cause for gratification that the New Mexico court in an ap-
proach both rational and realistic has rejected the doctrine.
WANDA LEE SPEARS
21 GEN. STAT. oF KAN. ANN. (1935) c. 60, art. 15, sec. 1506.
2 OKLA. STAT. (1941) tit. 12, sec. 1275.
"'Weiss v Weiss, 174 Mich. 431, 140 N.W 587- (1913), Johnsen
v. Johnsen, 78 Wash. 423, 139 Pac. 1200 (1914).
T Flagg v Flagg, 192 Wash. 679, 74 P 2d 189 (1937).
2 2See Hollingworth v. Hollingworth, 173 Ore. 286, 145 P 2d 466,
468 (1944), McElwee v. McElwee, 171 Ore. 462, 138 P 2d 208, 210
(1943).
1Pavletich v. Pavletich, 50 N.M. 224, 174 P 2d 826 (1946).
